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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to decide this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The first issue for the Court to determine is whether the trial court' s failure to consider the 
ability of the payor spouse to provide support constitutes an abuse of discretion. The standard of 
appellate review is that the appellate court will not reverse the trial court unless there exists a clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion. Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986). 
The second issue for the Court to decide is whether the trial court's failure to enter sufficient 
findings on the ability of the payor spouse to provide support constitutes an abuse of discretion. The 
standard of appellate review is that the trial court will not be overturned unless there is a clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion. Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986). 
The third issue for the Court to decide is whether the trial court erred when the trial court 
calculated Appellant's current income at a level equal to a ten percent reduction of Appellant's 
average income from the years 1992-1995 notwithstanding the fact that Appellant presented clear and 
convincing evidence that his actual current income is significantly lower than the $460,903.00 amount 
and the fact that neither party presented evidence tending to validate the trial court' s conclusion that 
Appellant currently makes ninety percent of his past income. The standard of appellate review is that 
the trial court's finding of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Pgtgrson v. Peterson, 
818 P.2d 1305, 1307-08 (Utah App. 1991). 
The fourth issue for the Court to decide is whether the trial court's failure to enter sufficient 
findings as to how the trial court concluded that Appellant's current income is ninety percent of his 
past average income constitutes an abuse of discretion. The standard of review is that the appellate 
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court will not reverse the trial court unless there is a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion. Paffel v. 
Paffel. 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986). 
The fifth issue for the Court to determine is whether the trial court erred by only imputing 
$1,000.00 per month until May of 1998 when the clear weight of evidence demonstrated that the Court 
should have imputed $2,500.00 per month beginning from the time of trial. The standard of appellate 
review is that the trial court's findings of fact will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. 
Peterson v. Peterson. 818 P.2d 1305, 1307-08 (Utah App. 1991). 
The sixth issue for the Court to determine is whether the trial court erred by ordering a 
retroactive modification of the temporary alimony even though Appellant had already made a timely 
payment of the debt as it became due. The standard of appellate review is that the appellate court will 
not reverse the trial court unless there is a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion. Paffel v. Paffel, 
732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY LAW 
"The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: (I) the financial 
condition and needs of the recipient spouse; (ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce 
income; (iii)the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and (iv) the length of the marriage. 
Utah Code Ann., § 30-3-5 (7)(a). 
"Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the amount imputed or a hearing 
is held and a finding made that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or under-employed." Utah Code 
Ann.. § 78-45-7.5 (7)(a). 
"If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment potential and probable 
earnings as derived from work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons 
of similar backgrounds in the community." Utah Code Ann., § 78-45-7.5 (7)(b). 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The parties in this matter were married on March 19, 1975. This case is an appeal from a 
decree of divorce granted to Appellee on June 3, 1997. In essence, this case centers on whether the 
trial court' s failure to consider evidence which clearly tends to show that Appellant currently makes 
well below the income levels which the court attributes to him constitutes an abuse of discretion. Since 
income and ability to pay support are inextricably connected, Appellant maintains that the court' s 
failure to consider such evidence violates the mandate of Utah Code Ann., § 30-3-5 (7)(a) wherein the 
trial judge must consider the ability of the payor spouse to provide support. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Appellee filed a Complaint for Divorce on March 6, 1995. On April 21, 1995, the parties 
entered into a Stipulation governing temporary matters whereby Appellant agreed to pay $6,500.00 per 
month to Appellee for temporary alimony. Appellant also agreed to pay $1,500.00 a month to 
Appellee for child support bringing the total monthly amount paid to Appellee to $8,000.00. Trial in 
this matter was set for May 2, and May 3, 1996, in the First District Court before the Honorable Clint 
S. Judkins. 
At the time of trial, counsel informed the court that the parties would limit the issues to 
alimony, property division and attorney s fees. With regard to the issue of alimony, the parties 
specifically disputed the amount of money earned by Appellant and the amount of money imputed to 
Appellee. During trial, both parties produced witnesses and submitted exhibits to the Court. On May 
7, 1996, the Court issued its ruling. 
Notwithstanding an abundance of evidence to the contrary, the trial court determined that 
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Appellant earned $512,114.00 per annum based on the average of his earnings for 1992-1995. In 
reaching this figure, the trial court refused to consider evidence of Appellant' s income from the first 
four months of 1996 which reflected the new area hospital contracts. The trial court also refused to 
consider the undisputed fact that Appellant's unusually high 1994 income simply reflected the fact that 
one his partners had not worked during the 1994 year and that Appellant had worked an inordinate 
amount of overtime to compensate for this absence. Rather, the trial court simply and arbitrarily 
anticipated that Appellant's 1996 earnings would decrease by ten percent (10%) leaving him with an 
income of $460,903.00 from which to calculate alimony. 
After child support and taxes, the trial court concluded that Appellant's income totaled 
approximately $22,029.00 per month. From this total the trial court awarded Appellee alimony in the 
amount of $11,015.00 per month. The total monthly amount awarded to Appellee was $12,415.00. In 
reaching this amount the trial court imputed $1,000.00 a month to Appellee. The trial court concluded, 
however, that inasmuch as Appellee could earn her teaching certificate in as little as two quarters, this 
imputed amount would increase to $2,500.00 in May of 1998. Correspondingly, the trial court 
reduced the alimony award by $1,500.00 at this time. 
Following the May 1996, trial, the Court required both parties to re-brief the case. In 
November of 1996, the court heard additional argument in this matter. After hearing additional 
argument regarding the tax consequences of the Court' s previous ruling, the Court reduced 
Appellant's alimony obligations by $500.00. The trial court refused, however, to consider current 
evidence regarding Appellant's present income. 
The Final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were prepared by Appellee over the 
objection of Appellant and were entered by the trial court on June 3, 1997. The final Decree of 
Divorce was entered on June 3, 1997. 
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C. Disposition in the Trial Court 
The trial court concluded that, based on an average of Appellant's income from 1992-1995, 
that Appellant earned $460,903.00 per annum. From this amount the trial court awarded Appellee 
$11,015.00 per month as alimony. Following a re-hearing on the issue to consider tax consequences, 
the trial court reduced this amount to $10,515.00. The Court ordered Appellant to pay this amount 
retroactively to the date of the trial. The trial court also ordered Appellant to pay Appellee an 
additional $1,400.00 per month in child support. 
The trial court further divided the marital estate. Pursuant to this division, the trial court 
awarded to Appellee the Logan home and furnishings, the Central Life account, two Jackson National 
accounts, a Suburban automobile, and a one-half interest in the VEBA, RANCON and Genesis general 
partnership. The trial court found the value of this portion of the estate to equal $326,215.00. The 
trial court awarded to Appellant the Providence home and furnishings, a recreational four-wheeler, a 
Blazer automobile, five Jackson National accounts, a Central Life account, Lord Abbot, IDEX, 
Oppenheimer, ATEL, and a one-half interest in the VEBA and RANCON accounts and a one-half 
interest in the Genesis general partnership. The trial court found the value of this estate to equal 
$221,469.00. 
To equalize the division of the property, the court ordered Appellee to pay Appellant the sum 
of $57,953.50. To satisfy this judgment, the court allowed Appellant to offset this amount owed 
against the arrearages which had accumulated in Appellant' s alimony from the date of the trial until the 
date of the decree. The court then allowed Appellant to reduce his alimony payment by $1,000.00 per 
month until Appellee retired the debt owed to Appellant. 
The Court ordered each party to bear their own attorney's fees by finding that the amount of 
Appellee's alimony and property award were sufficient to pay such a fee. The court upheld the parties' 
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stipulations with regards to the remaining issues of the divorce. 
D. Statement of the Facts 
1. The parties were married on March 19, 1975. During the course of this marriage three 
children were born, two of whom remain minors. (R. at 65). 
2. On March 6, 1995, Appellee filed a Complaint for Divorce. (R. at 357). 
3. On April 21, 1995, the parties entered into a stipulation whereby the parties agreed that 
Appellant would pay the total of $8,000.00 to Appellee in support with $6,500.00 of this sum allocated 
to alimony and $1,500.00 allocated to child support. At a subsequent Pre-Trial Conference held on 
March 26, 1996, the parties affirmed this stipulation. (R. at 2-6). 
4. Trial on this matter was held on May 2 and 3, 1996. The parties reserved three issues for 
resolution at trial: alimony, property division and attorney's fees. (R. at 7). 
5. During trial, Appellant presented extensive testimony regarding his present level of income. 
(R. At 443). 
6. Ruth Ann Finch, an assistant administrator at Western Surgery, testified that medical 
insurance companies had recently expanded the practice of discounting the rates for which they would 
pay doctors for the procedures which they perform. (R. at 167). Ms. Finch gave the specific example 
that a knee surgery performed in 1993 which paid the Appellant $1,211.00 would only pay $773.36 in 
1996. (R. At 169-70). Ms. Finch attributed this reduction to insurance company discounting. 
Appellee did not offer evidence to rebut this testimony. Ms. Finch further testified that Appellant 
derived 75% of his business from insurance contracts. (R. At 181). 
7. Ms. Finch also testified that 1994 represented an unusually high departure from Appellant' s 
average income. (R. At 178). Ms. Finch attributed this departure to the fact that one of Appellant's 
partners took an extensive sabbatical in 1994 which created an opportunity for Appellant to perform the 
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surgeries which his partner would have performed. (R. At 178). Appellee did not offer evidence to 
rebut this testimony. 
8. Ms. Finch testified that another doctor at Western Surgery currently made 35% less in 1996 
as compared with previous years due to changes in the medical climate in Cache Valley. ( R. At 180). 
Appellee did not offer evidence to rebut his testimony. 
9. Rusty Shelton, the CEO of Western Surgery, offered testimony showing that four new 
surgeons had signed contracts to enter the already saturated orthopedic surgeon market in Cache Valley 
in 1995 and 1996. (R. At 220). Mr. Shelton testified that this increase would immediately have a 
negative impact on Appellant's current salary. (R. At 220). 
10. Mr. Shelton, after concluding extensive national research on the subject, also testified that 
as the managed care and third party payors penetrated the Cache valley market that physicians in Cache 
Valley could expect to earn as much as 35% less in the future. (R. At 225). Appellee failed to 
introduce any evidence to show that national trends would not affect Cache Valley economies. 
11. Richard Dorigatti, the CPA for Western Surgery and the physicians therein, testified that 
Appellant had earned $100,398.00 during the first four months of 1996. Projected out over the 
remainder of the year, Mr. Dorigatti calculated that Appellant would earn $330,631.00 as a total for 
1996. (R. At 254). 
12. Troy Martin, another CPA employed by Western Surgery, testified that, unlike scenarios 
which present in other closely held corporations, Appellant could not artificially manipulate his income 
downward inasmuch as the administrators at Western Surgery controlled Appellant's billing as opposed 
to Appellant himself. (R. At 352-53). 
13. Appellee's own witness, Paul Simpkins, testified that he had failed to review Appellant's 1996 
records to determine Appellant's current income despite the fact that such records were available for 
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review. (R. At 107). Mr. Simpkins further conceded that the most accurate method to determine 
Appellant' s present income would be to take into consideration his 1996 income. (R. At 108). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Utah law mandates that a trial judge must consider the ability of the payor spouse to provide 
support when calculating the amount of alimony awarded to the receiving spouse. Failure to make such 
a consideration constitutes an abuse of discretion which the appellate court must reverse. When 
factoring in the payor spouse's ability to pay, the Court must consider his present ability as opposed to 
his historical ability to pay such an award inasmuch as the award will be paid from present as opposed 
to historical income. 
Following trial, the trial court failed to prepare adequate findings of fact. Utah law requires 
the Court to prepare adequate factual findings on all material issues necessary to support an award of 
alimony. The trial court's failure to make specific findings of fact with regard to Appellant's ability 
to provide support constitutes an error which the appellate court must rectify by overturning the award 
and remanding the matter. 
ARGUMENT 
I. TRIAL COURTS FINDING THAT APPELLANT EARNS $460,903.00 PER YEAR IS 
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS INASMUCH AS THIS FINDING IS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
The appellate court reviews the trial court' s findings of fact under the clearly erroneous 
standard. Cummings v. Cummings. 821 P.2d 472 (Utah App. 1991). This standard requires the 
Appellant to show that such findings are not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Saunders 
v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198 (Utah 1991). To meet this burden, Appellant must marshall all of the evidence 
supporting the findings and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the 
Court's decision below. Id. 
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In the Final Findings of Fact, paragraph 32, the trial court found: 
It is likely Defendant's income will be lower in 1996 and thereafter than the four year average 
determined by the Court. The Court finds that ten percent (10%) is an appropriate amount to 
reduce the average income, which is approximately $51,211.00. The Court, therefore, finds 
that Defendant's current income is $460,903.00 per year or $38,408.00 per month. 
Appellant must now marshall all of the evidence presented in trial which supports this finding that 
Appellant currently makes $460,903.00 and then demonstrate that such evidence is legally insufficient 
to support such a finding. In the instant case, Appellant's task is compounded by the fact that the trial 
court failed to prepare adequate findings of fact relative to how the trial court arrived at ten percent as 
the Appropriate amount" to reduce Appellant's historical income. 
In arriving at the $460,903.00 figure, the trial court makes two errors not supported by 
substantial evidence: 1) Relying on Appellant's historical income as an accurate gauge by which to 
measure Appellant's current income; and 2) Arbitrarily assigning the figure often percent as an 
accurate measure of Appellant's reduction in income. 
A. APPELLANTS HISTORICAL INCOME DOES NOT ACCURATELY PREDICT 
APPELLANTS PRESENT INCOME. 
With respect to the first issue, Appellant concedes that Appellee produced sufficient evidence at 
trial from which the Court could adduce that Appellant averaged $512,114.00 per year from the time 
period 1992-1995. This fact notwithstanding, Appellee did not produce legally sufficient evidence to 
allow the Court to use this average as a true reflection of Appellant's current income when measured 
against the substantial evidence to the contrary. 
In making the decision to use the average of 1992-1995 and exclude evidence from the first four 
months of 1996, the Court stated that "a four month duration is too short a time to determine any 
reliability, that it is not reflective of Defendant's actual income, and that a four year average is more 
appropriate to determine current income." (Findings of Fact at paragraph 30). This sentiment echoes 
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the testimony of witness Paul Simpkins who opined that a four month period was too short to determine 
Appellant' s income given the fluctuations which existed in Appellant' s month to month income. (R. 
At 325-26). 
The Court's decision to exclude 1996 records and rely solely on the four year average, 
however, does not conform to the overwhelming bulk of testimony presented to the contrary. In fact, 
Appellee's own witness, Paul Simpkins, upon whom the Court apparently relied in making its finding, 
conceded during cross-examination that the best indication of Appellant's current income has to take 
into consideration the 1996 income. (R. At 108). In addition, Appellant's witnesses, Ruth Ann Finch, 
Richard Dorigatti and Rusty Shelton, all testified that a four year average from 1992-1995 would not 
give an accurate measure of Appellant's income. In reaching this conclusion, the witnesses cited two 
controlling facts: 1) 1994 was an aberrant year for earnings; and 2) the medical climate no longer 
fostered the types of income historically seen. 
i. When calculating income, trial court may not rely upon overtime which is inconsistent 
and speculative. 
When a court calculates a payor spouse's income for purposes of determining an alimony 
award, overtime income may be used only if the overtime has been consistent and the calculation of 
overtime is not speculative. Crompton v. Crompton. 888 P.2d 686 (Utah App. 1994). In calculating 
Appellant's income, the trial court erred by including figures from 1994. The clear weight of 
testimony presented at trial tended to show that Appellant earned significantly more during 1994 than 
he had earned before or since. The testimony conclusively demonstrated that this increase resulted 
from the overtime which Appellant worked during this year. 
Ms. Finch testified that during 1994, Appellant had the opportunity to increase his earnings by 
filling in for a partner who had taken a six month sabbatical. (R. At 178). During this period of time, 
Appellant performed more procedures and subsequently earned more money than he ever had 
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previously or has since. (R. At 178). When the partner returned, Appellant's opportunities to 
perform additional procedures decreased. Appellee did not offer evidence to rebut this testimony, 
rather, Mr. Simpkins conceded that Appellant's revenue increased dramatically in 1994. (R. At 95). 
Mr. Simpkins also admitted that Appellant's income fell in 1995 following the return of the absent 
doctor. (R. At 96). 
For purposes of calculating alimony, this increase in 1994 can only be attributed to the 
overtime which Appellant worked during his partner's sabbatical. Since this doctor's return, 
Appellant did not have the opportunity to work consistent overtime. Since the overtime was not 
consistent, the trial court's inclusion of 1994 for purposes of calculating income is an error under 
Crompton. 
ii. The overwhelming weight of evidence demonstrated that changes in health care caused 
lower incomes for doctors. 
Ms. Finch, Mr. Shelton and Mr. Dorigatti each testified that the medical economy in Cache 
Valley no longer supported the amounts of income historically seen. Ms. Finch testified that the 
practice of insurance companies paying discounted rates for procedures increased during the period 
1992-1996. (R. At 167). As such, a surgery which paid $1,211.00 in 1993 only paid $773.36 in 
1995. (R. At 169-70). Ms. Finch testified that seventy-five percent of Appellant's practice stemmed 
from insurance contracts. (R. At 181). Appellee did not offer testimony to refute this testimony, 
rather, Mr. Simpkins acknowledged that insurance discounts had recently increased. (R. At 124). 
Mr. Shelton testified that national health management trends had begun to affect Cache Valley 
in 1995 and 1996. (R. At 245). As a result of these trends, physicians could realistically expect to 
earn thirty-five percent less in 1996 than in the previous years. (R. At 225). Ms. Finch testified that 
another doctor employed at Western Surgery made thirty-five percent less in 1996 than he did in 1995. 
(R. At 180). Mr. Shelton also testified to the fact that four additional surgeons were under contract in 
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1996 than in 1994. The addition of these four surgeons would only decrease the amount of money 
which Appellant earned and make the historical average less reliable. (R. At 220). Mr. Dorigatti 
testified that Appellant' s revenues for 1996 were significantly lower in 1996 when compared to 
previous years. (R. At 244). When projected over a twelve month period, Mr. Dorigatti estimated 
that Appellant would earn $330,631.00 for the 1996 year. (R. At 254). Appellee did not offer 
testimony regarding any changes in the medical economy in Cache Valley. 
In short, witnesses for both Appellant and Appellee stated that the trial court should at least 
consider 1996 revenue when determining Appellant' s current income. In addition, Appellant produced 
an overwhelming amount of unrefuted testimony tending to show that Appellant's historical average 
did not accurately reflect Appellant's present income. At the very least, the trial court's failure to 
consider 1996 revenue leads to a clearly erroneous finding not supported by substantial evidence. The 
substantial bulk of testimony, however, demonstrated that any reliance on Appellant's historical 
average could only lead to an erroneous finding. 
B. TRIAL COURTS TEN PERCENT REDUCTION IN INCOME IS ARBITRARY AND 
NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
With regard to the second issue, Appellant's task of marshaling evidence which supports the 
trial court' s finding is compounded by the trial court's failure to prepare adequate Findings of Fact. 
In the Findings of Fact, the Court states that "ten percent is an appropriate amount to reduce the 
average income." The Court, however, neglects to inform the parties exactly how the court determined 
that ten percent became the appropriate number. 
During trial, several witnesses gave testimony regarding Appellant's ability to earn income. 
Mr. Simpkins provided the court with a four year historical average of Appellant's earnings and 
concluded that Appellant showed an overall increase in his net average from 1992 to 1995. (R. At 96). 
Ms. Finch testified that physicians at Western Surgery were all making much less in 1996 when 
12 
compared to previous years. (R. At 180). In particular, one doctor at Western Surgery was making 
thirty-five percent less in 1996 than he had in previous years. (R. At 180). Mr. Shelton confirmed that 
orthopedic surgeons in Utah could expect to earn thirty-five percent less than they had made 
historically. (R. At 225). Appellee did not offer testimony refuting the fact that physicians at Western 
Surgery made less in 1996 than they had made previously. Rather, Mr. Simpkins conceded that he had 
undertaken no independent analysis of Western Surgery or the Cache Valley medical economy. (R. At 
92, 343). 
Other testimony offered during trial isolated the cause of the decrease in revenue. Ms. Finch 
attributed part of the decrease to insurance discounting. (R. At 167). Another part she attributed to the 
addition of new doctors. (R. At 179). Mr. Shelton traced a portion of the decrease to reduced 
Medicare payments. (R. At 231). Still another, he attributed to managed health care programs. (R. At 
225). The witnesses each assigned different percentages to the decreases they listed. Without knowing 
more, Appellant cannot guess as to which number the Court decided to use to arrive at the ten percent 
reduction the Court employed. 
What is certain, however, is that Appellant's witnesses looked at hard data in determining that 
Appellant's 1996 income was lower than previous years. Mr. Dorigatti presented receipts from the 
first four months of 1996. This data showed that Appellant earned $100,398.00 for the first four 
months of 1996. (R. At 254). Appellee presented no competent or substantial evidence which showed 
that Appellant earned more than this figure. When projected over a twelve month period, Mr. 
Dorigatti estimated that Appellant would earn $330,631.00 during 1996. (R. At 254). The Court will 
note that in arriving at this conclusion, Mr. Dorigatti did more than simply multiply the revenues from 
the first four months by three. Rather, this figure represents the best professional estimate which Mr. 
Dorigatti could form when presented with all available data. 
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In arriving at its ten percent reduction figure for 1996, the trial court did not rely on any 
evidence regarding 1996 presented by Appellee. Mr. Simpkins, Appellee's only financial expert, 
acknowledged that he had opted not to review any 1996 data even though such data was available. (R. 
At 107-08). It is particularly worth noting that Mr. Simpkins makes this acknowledgment while 
conceding that the best indication of Appellant' s current income would have to consider 1996 revenue. 
(R. At 108). But, since Appellee offered no competent or substantial evidence regarding 1996 
income, the Court could not rely upon such when arriving at the ten percent figure. 
Rather, it appears the Court accepted the premise that Appellant would make less in 1996 and 
thereafter when compared to his historical income. Instead of relying on the unrefiited data which Mr. 
Dorigatti presented, however, the trial court apparently arbitrarily designated ten percent as the number 
by which to reduce Appellant's historical income. Inasmuch as the overwhelming bulk of the 
testimony presented at trial does not support this finding, this finding is clearly erroneous. 
II. TRIAL COURTS FAILURE TO CONSIDER PAYOR SPOUSES ABILITY TO 
PROVIDE SUPPORT CONSTITUTES ERROR. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (7)(a) provides: "The court shall consider at least the following factors in 
determining alimony: (i) the financial conditions and needs of the recipient spouse; (ii) the recipient' s 
earning capacity or ability to produce income; (iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
and (iv) the length of the marriage." The third factor requires the Court to make a determination as to 
the ability of Appellant to provide support to Appellee. This inquiry typically requires the trial court to 
ascertain the payor spouse's income. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985). The Court of 
Appeals has stated unequivocally that a "[fjailure to analyze the parties' circumstances in light of these 
three factors constitutes an abuse of discretion." Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986). 
Merely establishing an arbitrary income figure not supported by the evidence, however, will not 
suffice. 
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As outlined above, in determining Appellant' s income the trial court simply subtracted ten 
percent from Appellant's historical income averaged from 1992-1995. In so doing, the Court made 
two erroneous assumptions: 1) That the historical average accurately evidenced Appellant' s current 
income; and 2) That the ten percent figure accurately reflected Appellant's actual decrease in income. 
Not only does this assumption lead to a clearly erroneous finding, however, this approach does not 
comply with statutory mandates. 
Utah courts have consistently held that a trial court may only rely on historical evidence of 
income as an accurate measure of ability when a party experiences a temporary decrease in income. 
As this Court stated in Cox v. Cox. 877 P.2d 1262, 1267 (Utah App. 1994), "In assessing spousal 
support, trial courts have appropriately relied on historical income rather than income at the time of the 
divorce where a party Ahas experienced a temporary decrease in income,'" (quoting Olson v. Olson , 
704 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah 1985)). 
The instant case, however, does not present a situation where a trial court may use Appellant's 
historical average as a measure of Appellant's ability to provide support. The case law is clear that 
historical income may only be used when the payor spouse experiences a temporary decrease in 
income. In the instant case, witnesses for the Appellant presented extensive evidence that Appellant's 
decrease in income was permanent. As mentioned above, witnesses isolated several causes for the 
decrease in income ranging from changes in health care management to market saturation. No 
evidence was presented at trial to suggest these causes were temporary in nature. Rather, these causes 
will permanently affect Appellant's income. 
In the Findings of Fact, the trial court appears to accept the premise that Appellant's earnings 
have decreased permanently. In paragraph 32, the Court states, "The Court finds that it is likely 
Defendant's income will be lower in 1996 and thereafter than the four year average determined by the 
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Court," (emphasis added). Hence, the Court accepts that the causes leading to the decline in income 
will continue to exist beyond a temporary time period. Since the decline is not temporary, the Court 
may not use any evidence of historical income but must instead rely on evidence of current income. 
Mr. Dorigatti presented evidence that Appellant's current income amounted to $330,631.00. 
(R. At 254). Witnesses for Appellee chose not to present evidence regarding Appellant's 1996 
income. (R. At 108). Since current income and ability to pay are inescapably connected, the trial 
court committed error by awarding alimony based on the $460,903.00 amount as opposed to the 
amount shown at trial to be Appellant's current income. 
III. TRIAL COURTS FAILURE TO ENTER SUFFICIENT FINDINGS ON THE ISSUE 
OF ALIMONY WARRANTS REVERSAL OF TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS. 
In addition to considering the above listed factors, the trial court is required to enter sufficient 
findings in the record. As the Court stated in Breinholt v. Breinholt. 905 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah App. 
1995), "The trial court is required to enter sufficient findings on the three enumerated factors, and we 
will reverse if it fails to do so unless the relevant facts contained within the record are 'clear, 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment,'" (quoting Howell 
v. Howell. 806 P.2d 1209, 1218 (Utah App. 1991)). Moreover, the Court must make factual findings 
on the reasonableness of each need for which the receiving spouse claims to require support. Willev v. 
Willev. 866 P.2d 547, 551 (Utah App. 1993). In the instant case, the trial court has failed to prepare 
sufficient findings relative to the four factors enumerated by statute. 
With regard to the issue of Appellant' s ability to provide support, the trial court expressly 
found that Appellant earned $460,903.00 per year. The Court stated that it reached this amount by 
taking the historical amount earned by Appellant in the four previous years and then subtracting ten 
percent of this amount. This conclusory mention of how the Court arrived at its figure does not qualify 
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as an "adequate factual finding on all material issues necessary to support an award of alimony." 
Chamber v. Chambers. 840 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah App. 1992). Neither does such a finding fit into the 
exception as a fact which is clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of 
judgment. 
As detailed above, the clear weight of testimony offered at trial tended to show that Appellant 
earned significantly less than $460,903.00. Absent a detailed finding outlining how the court arrived at 
the ten percent figure, this finding cannot stand. This error in and of itself requires this Court to 
reverse the finding of the trial court. 
IV. THE ONLY EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT SUPPORTS A FINDING THAT 
APPELLEE SHOULD HAVE IMPUTED INCOME OF $2,500.00 PER MONTH FROM 
THE TIME THE COURT ENTERS THE DECREE OF DIVORCE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5 (7) describes the procedure to be used at trial to impute income to 
a party. Said statute provides: 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the amount 
imputed or a hearing is held and a finding is made that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or 
under-employed. 
(7) (b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment 
potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, occupation qualifications, and 
prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the community. 
In order to impute income to a party, the trial court must follow the guidelines enumerated in this 
statute. 
In the instant case, the only evidence before the Court on the amount of income to be imputed 
to Appellee was undisputed. John Matthews, a labor economist employed by the State of Utah, 
testified that a new teacher in Cache Valley earned $12.96 per hour or $29,299.00 per year. (R. At 
21-23). Mr. Matthews also testified that there were currently fifty openings in the State of Utah for 
17 
elementary and secondary level teachers. (R. At 23). 
In light of these facts, Appellee testified that she could earn her teaching certificate in four 
quarters. (R. At 360). Appellee also testified that during the hours between 8:30 a.m. and 3:30 p.m. 
that her children attended school and that she could do as she pleased during that time. (R. At 361). 
Notwithstanding this testimony, however, Appellee admitted that she hadn' t taken steps to advance her 
career training in the year and four months since her separation and the time of trial. (R. At 363). 
Applying this unrefuted testimony to the relative statute shows that Appellee was voluntarily 
unemployed and that Appellee could realistically expect to earn nearly $30,000.00 per year as a teacher 
upon the completion of her teacher certificate. Had Appellee begun work toward the completion of 
this certificate upon her separation, Appellee would have completed this certificate before the beginning 
of trial. The statute is clear. Appellee does not have the option of staying home or accepting a lower 
paying job; she must take steps to support herself and her children. 
V. TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ORDERING APPELLANT TO PAY AWARDED 
ALIMONY RETROACTIVE TO TIME OF TRIAL. 
Under Utah law, a judgment does not become enforceable until such judgment is signed and 
filed with the clerk of the court. Rule 58(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Wisdon v. Salina. 696 
P.2d 1205 (Utah 1985); Pate v. Marathon Steel Co.. 692 P.2d 765 (Utah 1984). Further, this Court 
has stated, "Once temporary support obligations become due, they are no more retroactively modifiable 
than final decrees." Whitehead v. Whitehead. 836 P.2d 814, 816 (Utah App. 1992). 
The State of Utah has long recognized the authority of the parties to make agreements 
concerning the monetary terms of a divorce, and absent a showing of fraud, hardship, duress, 
concealment, or mutual mistake, the court may not retroactively upset such an agreement. Wallis v. 
WalUs, 342 P.2d 103 (Utah 1959); Shelton v. Shelton, 885 P.2d 807 (Utah App. 1994). In the instant 
case, the parties reached a stipulation on April 21, 1995. Pursuant to the terms of this stipulation, the 
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parties agreed that Appellant would pay the sum of $6,500.00 per month as temporary alimony. 
Appellant paid this amount from April, 1995, until June 1997 (the date the final decree of divorce was 
signed and entered in the record). 
In the Divorce Decree, signed June 3, 1997, the trial court ordered Appellant to pay $10, 
515.00 per month as and for alimony commencing May 1, 1996. This order constitutes an abuse of 
discretion. Once Appellant makes the payments as the payments become due, they become unalterable 
debts which cannot be changed or modified thereafter. Whitehead, at 816; Shelton, at 808; Larsen v. 
Larsen. 561 P.2d 1077, 1079 (Utah 1977). Had the Court wished to modify the stipulation, the Court 
could have ordered a prospective modification to govern the interim period between trial and the 
entering of judgment. Karen v. State Dept. of Social Serve.. 716 P.2d 810, 813 (Utah 1986). The 
Court, however, failed to make such an order. 
On these facts, the Court simply cannot award retroactive alimony. Each of the payments was 
paid in a timely manner prior to the entry of judgment. The Court' s order amounts to an abuse of 
discretion which this Court must reverse. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Appellant hereby moves this Court to reverse the trial court's award of 
alimony in favor of an award commensurate with the facts presented at trial and Utah Law. 
Dated this 5th day of March, 1998. 
SKEEN & ROBINSON, L.L.C. 
Randall L. Skeen, 
Shiiwn H. Robinson, 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I herewith certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of SKEEN & ROBINSON, 
L.L.C. 3760 So. Highland Drive, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, UT 84106, and that in said capacity the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT was served upon the Appellee by mailing via first-class mail, 
postage prepaid, two true aitd correct copies thereof to the following this 5th day of March, 1998: 
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247) 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
Suite 722, Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 /^~*\ r\ )/^~ 
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JUN2 7 1997 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KIM LARSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRAD LARSON, 
Defendant. 
FINAL 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 954-08 IDA 
Judge Clint S. Judkins 
This matter came before the Court for trial on May 2 -3 , 1996, the Honorable Clint 
S. Judkins, District Court Judge, presiding. Plaintiff appeared in person and with her 
attorney, Stephen W. Jewell. Defendant appeared in person and with his attorney, Kenneth 
A. Okazaki, PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER. The Court having received and 
accepted certain stipulations of the parties and having heard and received testimony and 
evidence, and all other kindred matters having been resolved and the Court having examined 
the evidence and being fully advised in the premises after subsequent hearings, arguments 
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of counsel and the submission of memoranda, and having previously entered a Decree of 
Divorce dated June 12, 1996, intended as a temporary Decree of Divorce until the resolution 
of all issues, those issues having been ruled upon by the Court, and having previously 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now makes and enters the following 
Decree: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
1. The Court reaffirms the Decree of Divorce entered in this action, the same to be 
final as of June 12, 1996. 
CUSTODY AND VISITATION 
2. The parties shall be and are hereby granted joint legal and physical custody of 
the minor children of the parties, to wit: Krista Larson, bom July 4, 1982; and Gregory 
Larson, born November 20, 1986. Plaintiff is awarded seventy-five percent (75%) of the 
custodial time and Defendant is awarded twenty-five percent (25%) of the custodial time 
with said minor children. Custodial exchanges will continue on the current schedule, with 
Defendant to have the children ever}* Tuesday overnight and every other weekend, unless as 
otherwise agreed between the parties. All other custodial time, unless otherwise agreed 
between the parties, will be pursuant to the Utah Statutory Visitation Guidelines, Section 30-
3-33, Utah Code, including four (4) consecutive weeks during the summer. Visitation shall 
otherwise be as follows: 
A. In years ending in an odd number, the father, (Defendant) 
is entitled to the following holidays: 
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(1) Day before or after child(ren)'s actual birthday beginning 
at 3:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m.; 
(2) Human Rights Day beginning 6:00 p.m. the day before 
the holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
(3) Easter holiday beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday until 
Sunday at 7:00 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a 
lengthier period of time to which the father (Defendant) 
is completely entitled; 
(4) Memorial Day beginning 6:00 p.m. on Friday until 
Monday at 7:00 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a 
lengthier period of time to which the father (Defendant) 
is completely entitled; 
(5) July 24th beginning 6:00 p.m. on the day before the 
holiday until 11:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
(6) Veteran's day holiday beginning 6:00 p.m. the day 
before the holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; and 
(7) The first portion of the Christmas school vacation** as 
defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas Eve 
and Christmas Day until 1:00 p.m., so long as the entire 
holiday is equally divided; 
B. In years ending in an even number, the father (Defendant) 
is entitled to the following holidays: 
(1) Child(ren)'s birthday on actual birth date beginning at 
3:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m.; 
(2) New Year's Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before 
the holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
(3) President's Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before 
the holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
"» 
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(4) July 4th beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the 
holiday until 11:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
(5) Labor Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday until 
Monday at 7:00 p.m. unless the holiday extends for 
lengthier period of time to which the father (Defendant) 
is completely entitled; 
(6) The fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as 
U.E.A. weekend beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Wednesday 
until Sunday at 7:00 p.m. unless the holiday extends for 
a lengthier period of time to which the father (Defendant) 
is completely entitled; 
(7) Columbus Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the 
holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
(8) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7:00 p.m. 
until Sunday at 7:00 p.m.; and 
(9) The second portion of the Christmas school vacation** 
as defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas 
day beginning at 1:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m., as long as the 
entire Christmas holiday is equally divided; 
C. Father's Day shall be spent with the father every year beginning 
at 9:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
D. Mother's Day shall be spent with the mother every year 
beginning at 9:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
E. Extended visitation with the father (Defendant) may be: 
(1) Up to four (4) weeks consecutive at the option of the 
father (Defendant); 
(2) Two (2) weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the 
noncustodial parent father (Defendant); and 
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(3) The remaining two (2) weeks shall be subject to 
visitation for the custodial parent mother (Plaintiff) 
consistent with these guidelines; 
F. The mother (Plaintiff) shall have an identical two (2) week 
period of uninterrupted time during the child(ren)'s summer 
vacation from school for purposes of vacation; 
G. If the child(ren) is/are enrolled in year-round school, the father's 
(Defendant) extended visitation shall be one-half (14) of the 
vacation time for year-round school breaks, provided the mother 
(Plaintiff) has holiday and telephone visits; 
H. Notification of extended visitation or vacation weeks with the 
child(ren) shall be provided at least thirty (30) days in advance 
to the other parent: 
I. Holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation, and 
changes shall not be made to the regular rotation of the 
alternating weekend visitation schedule; 
*£> 
J. If a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school day, the father 
(Defendant) shall be responsible for the child(ren)'s attendance 
at school for that school day; 
K. If a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and 
the total holiday period extends beyond that time so that the 
child(ren) is/are free from school and the parent is free from 
work, the father (Defendant) shall be entitled to this lengthier 
holiday period; 
L. Telephone contact at reasonable hours; and 
M. Such other times as agreed between the parties. 
**"Christmas school vacation" means the time period beginning on the 
evening the child gets out of school for the Christmas school break until the 
evening before the child returns to school, except for Christmas Eve, 
Christmas Day, and New Year's Day. 
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"Extended visitation" means a period of visitation other than a weekend, 
holiday as provided in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(f) and (2)(g), religious holidays 
as provided in Subsections 30-3-33(4) and (16), and i;Christmas school 
vacation. 
The parties shall further comply with the following: 
Keep each other advised of their current address and telephone number within 
twenty four (24) hours of any change; 
Special consideration shall be given by each parent to make the child(ren) 
available to attend family functions including funerals, weddings, family 
reunions, religious holidays, important ceremonies, and other significant 
events in the life of the child(ren) or in the life of either parent which may 
inadvertently conflict with the visitation schedule; 
The father (Defendant) shall pick up the child(ren) at the time specified and 
return the child(ren) at the time specified, and the child(ren)'s regular school 
hours shall not be interrupted; 
The mother (Plaintiff) shall notify the father (Defendant) within twenty-four 
(24) hours of receiving notice of all significant school, social, sports, and 
community function in which the child(ren) is/are participating or being 
honored, and the father (Defendant) shall be entitled to attend and participate 
folly; 
The father (Defendant) shall have access directly to all school reports 
including preschool and day care reports and medical records and shall be 
notified immediately by the mother (Plaintiff) in the event of a medical 
emergency; 
Parental care shall be presumed to be better care for the child(ren) than 
surrogate care and the court shall encourage the parties to cooperate in 
allowing the father (Defendant), if willing and able, to provide child care; 
Each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of major religious holidays 
celebrated by the parents, and the parent who celebrates a religious holiday 
that the other parent does not celebrate shall have the right to be together with 
the child(ren) on the religious holiday. 
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Refrain from making derogatory remarks about or to the other in the presence 
of the minor children. 
CHILD SUPPORT AND CHILD CARE 
3. Child support shall be and is hereby ordered at $1,400.00 per month for the 
parties' two (2) minor children, less a credit for one-half of the insurance premium as 
provided in Paragraph 7. 
4. Said child support payments shall be and are hereby due one-half (14) on or 
before the fifth (5th) day and one-half (14) on or before the twentieth (20th) day of each 
month commencing May 1, 1996, and continuing every month thereafter until each child 
reaches the age of eighteen (18) or graduates from high school through normal matriculation, 
whichever is later. Upon Defendant's child support obligation for Krista being terminated, 
child support shall be automatically rescheduled using the maximum child support amount 
for one (1) child. 
5. Child support payments may be made directly to Plaintiff. If Defendant 
becomes delinquent in payment of support, said payments shall then be paid through 
automatic income withholding through the Utah State Department of Human Services, Office 
of Recovery Services by serving an Order to Withhold and Deliver. In accordance with Utah 
Code Annotated § 62A-1 l-403(2)(b) and 78-45-7(4), the Defendant will then be assessed an 
additional check processing fee in the amount of S7.00, or such other amount as required by 
statute. This fee shall be included in the amount withheld and paid to the Office of Recovery 
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Services. As an alternative to automatic income withholding, Defendant may pay support 
by wage assignment and/or direct deposit to Plaintiffs checking account. 
6. Child support shall be abated by one-half QA) during summer visitation as long 
as the children are with Defendant for at least twenty-five (25) of thirty (30) consecutive 
days. 
HEALTH INSURANCE 
7. That Defendant shall provide health insurance for said minor children if 
insurance is available at a reasonable cost. Each party should pay one-half (14) of the 
uninsured medical and dental expenses for the children. Medical coverage should include 
all regular health and medical care, eye care, psychological care, dental and orthodontic 
work. Reimbursement shall be made by the other party within thirty (30) days of receipt of 
such verification. 
LTFE INSURANCE 
8. Each part}' shall be and is hereby awarded their present life insurance policies 
on themselves. The Court makes no order regarding maintaining insurance on behalf of the 
children. 
DIVISION OF PROPERTY 
9. The Plaintiff shall be and is hereby awarded the parties1 home and real property 
located at 240 North 1480 East, Logan, Utah, valued at $520,000.00 with an equity of 
5245,506.00, free and clear of any interest of Defendant. Defendant shall immediately 
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execute a Quit Claim Deed in favor of Plaintiff. Plaintiff shall be responsible for the 
mortgage, taxes, insurance and any other costs or assessments related to said property. 
10. The Defendant is shall be and is hereby awarded the home and real property 
with improvements at 745 East Foxridge, Providence, Utah, with an equity value of 
$105,600.00, free and clear of any interest of Plaintiff. Defendant shall be responsible for 
the mortgage, taxes, insurance and any other costs or assessment related to said property. 
11. Plaintiff shall return to Defendant his own personal genealogy and the figurines 
from his grandmother. The parties will also find a convenient time for Defendant to review 
family pictures and make copies of any family pictures requested by Defendant. Plaintiff 
shall make those pictures available for copying at Defendant's expense. Defendant will be 
responsible for returning all pictures to Plaintiff as quickly as possible. 
12. Plaintiff shall be and is hereby awarded the furniture and furnishings in her 
possession at a value of $50,000.00. 
13. Defendant shall be and is hereby awarded the furniture and furnishings in his 
possession,, including the stereo, books, office and computer, valued at $16,000.00. 
14. Defendant shall be and is hereby awarded the four-wheeler with blade, valued 
at $3,000.00. 
15. Plaintiff shall be and is hereby awarded the Suburban valued at $28,500.00. 
16. Defendant shall be and is hereby awarded the Blazer valued at $24,000.00. 
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17. Plaintiff shall be and is hereby awarded the Central Life and two (2) Jackson 
National Policies identified hereinafter. 
18. Defendant shall be and is hereby awarded the five (5) Jackson National 
Policies, Central Life Policy, Lord Abbot IRA, IDEX 401(K), Oppenheimer and ATEL 
Account as stated hereinafter. 
19. The Court does not establish the value on the VEBA and hereby awards one-
half (14) of the VEBA to each party to be distributed pursuant to a qualified domestic 
relations order. However, the Court will allow Defendant, at his sole discretion, to otherwise 
liquidate the VEBA, providing notice to Plaintiff of any such liquidation. Defendant shall 
immediately pay one-half (14) of any net proceeds realized from the VEBA to Plaintiff, if it 
is liquidated. 
20. The Court further hereby awards one-half (!/>) of the RANCON Investment to 
each of the parties. The Genesis Family Limited Partnership shall be and is hereby awarded 
as follows: Fifty percent (50%) each party. However, the Court creates a voting right and 
awards that.right to Defendant so that he has voting rights of all four shares. Plaintiff has an 
economic one-half interest, but Defendant has the right to control the partnership.2 1 
The Court, therefore, hereby awards the property and values as follows: 
To Plaintiff: 
ASSET VALUES 
Logan home $ 245,506.00 
Furnishings in Logan home 50,000.00 
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Central Life 
Jackson National 
Jackson National 
Suburban (Trade/Pontiac) 
One-half ('/2)VEB A 
One-half (l/2)RANCON 
One-half (!/2) General Partnership, Genesis 
TOTAL: 
1,593.00 
324.00 
292.00 
28,500.00 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
S 326,215.00 
To Defendant: 
ASSET 
Providence home 
Furnishings in Providence home 
Four-wheeler with blade 
Blazer 
Jackson National 
Jackson National 
Jackson National 
Jackson National 
VALUES 
105,600.00 
16,000.00 
3,000.00 
24,000.00 
2,340.00 
6,213.00 
2,009.00 
1,991.00 
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Jackson National 
Central Life 
Lord Abbot 
IDEX 
Oppenheimer 
ATEL 
One-half ('/2)VEBA 
One-half ('/2) RANCON 
One-half C/2) General Partnership, Genesis 
2,575.00 
18,481.00 
6,590.00 
8,061.00 
2,229.00 
22,380.00 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
TOTAL S 221,469.00 
DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS 
22. Each party shall assume and pay the mortgage associated with the property 
awarded to each party, holding the other harmless therefrom. 
23. Defendant shall assume and be responsible for the credit card debt with MBNA 
atSll,161.00. 
24. Each party shall be responsible for all individual and personal debts and 
obligations incurred since the parties' separation on or about February 1, 1995, holding the 
other part}' harmless therefrom. 
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EQUALIZATION OF MARITAL ESTATE 
25. As of June 1, 1997, Plaintiff shall pay to Defendant the balance of the amount 
due on the property division of 57,058.50 (as provided in Paragraphs 27 and 28 of the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law), to be paid by allowing Defendant to deduct up 
to SI.000.00 per month for alimony until said 57,058.50 is paid and satisfied. 
ALIMONY 
26. Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff 510,515.00 per month as and for alimony 
commencing May 1, 1996. 
27. Commencing May 1, 1998, alimony shall be automatically reduced by 
51,500.00 per month. 
28. Alimony shall continue until the death of either party, Plaintiffs remarriage 
or cohabitation, or as otherwise provided by statute or order of the Court. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
29. Each party shall pay his or her own attorney's fees and costs incurred in this 
matter. 
DATED this 6 day of J w ^ _ _ , 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
/S/ CL!i\T 3. JUrx<i>J3 
Clint S. Judkins 
District Court Judse 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the .C&VTV day of May, 1997,1 mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing FINAL DECREE OF DIVORCE, to the following person(s), postage pre-
paid thereon, by depositing in the U.S. Mail. 
Kenneth A. Okazaki 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
NOTICE 
You will please take notice that the above entitled document will be presented by the 
clerk to the assigned commissioner and/or judge for his signature upon the expiration of five 
(5) days frorii the date of this Notice, pius three (3) days for mailing, unless written objection 
is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration. 
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eft*in 
RECEIVED 
\m 2 A 1QQ7 
Stephen W.Jewell, 3814 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
15 South Main, Third Floor 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801)753-2000 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KIM LARSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRAD LARSON, 
Defendant. 
FINAL 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 954-08 IDA 
Judge Clint S. Judkins 
This matter came before the Court for trial on May 2 -3 , 1996, the Honorable Clint 
S. Judkins, District Court Judge, presiding. Plaintiff appeared in person and with her 
attorney, Stephen W. Jewell. Defendant appeared in person and with his attorney, Kenneth 
A. Okazaki, PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER. The Court having received and 
accepted certain stipulations of the parties and having heard and received testimony and 
1 
evidence, and all other kindred matters having been resolved and the Court having examined 
the evidence and being fully advised in the premises after subsequent hearings, arguments 
of counsel and the submission of memoranda, and having previously entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law dated June 12, 1996, intended as temporary Findings and 
Conclusions until the resolution of all issues, those issues having been ruled upon by the 
Court, now makes and enters the following: 
FINAL 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
JURISDICTION 
1. That the Plaintiff is now and has been for three (3) months immediately 
preceding the filing of this action, a resident of Cache County, State of Utah. 
2. That Plaintiff and Defendant were married to each other on the 19th day of 
March, 1975, in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
GROUNDS 
3. That there have arisen irreconcilable differences of the marriage between 
Plaintiff and Defendant. The parties have attempted reconciliation of their differences, but 
are unable to continue the marriage. 
CUSTODY AND VISITATION 
4. The parties shall be granted joint legal and physical custody of the minor 
children of the parties, to wit: Krista Larson, born July 4, 1982; and Gregory Larson, bom 
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November 20, 1986. Plaintiff is awarded seventy-five percent (75%) of the custodial time 
and Defendant is awarded twenty-five percent (25%) of the custodial time with said minor 
children. Custodial exchanges will continue on the current schedule, with Defendant to have 
the children every Tuesday overnight and every other weekend, unless as otherwise agreed 
between the parties. All other custodial time, unless otherwise agreed, will be pursuant to 
the Utah Statutory Visitation Guidelines, Section 30-3-33, Utah Code, including four (4) 
consecutive weeks during the summer. Visitation shall otherwise be as follows: 
A. In years ending in an odd number, the father, (Defendant) 
is entitled to the following holidays: 
(1) Day before or after child(ren)'s actual birthday beginning 
at 3:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m.; 
(2) Human Rights Day beginning 6:00 p.m. the day before 
the holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
(3) Easter holiday beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday until 
Sunday at 7:00 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a 
lengthier period of time to which the father (Defendant) 
is completely entitled; 
(4) Memorial Day beginning 6:00 p.m. on Friday until 
Monday at 7:00 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a 
lengthier period of time to which the father (Defendant) 
is completely entitled; 
(5) July 24th beginning 6:00 p.m. on the day before the 
holiday until 11:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
3 
(6) Veteran's day holiday beginning 6:00 p.m. the day 
before the holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; and 
(7) The first portion of the Christmas school vacation** as 
defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas Eve 
and Christmas Day until 1:00 p.m., so long as the entire 
holiday is equally divided; 
In years ending in an even number, the father (Defend 
is entitled to the following holidays: 
(1) Child(ren)'s birthday on actual birth date beginning at 
3:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m.; 
(2) New Year's Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before 
the holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
(3) President's Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before 
the holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
(4) July 4th beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the 
holiday until 11:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
(5) Labor Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday until 
Monday at 7:00 p.m. unless the holiday extends for 
lengthier period of time to which the father (Defendant) 
is completely entitled; 
(6) The fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as 
U.E.A. weekend beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Wednesday 
until Sunday at 7:00 p.m. unless the holiday extends for 
a lengthier period of time to which the father (Defendant) 
is completely entitled; 
(7) Columbus Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the 
holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
(8) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7:00 p.m. 
until Sunday at 7:00 p.m.; and 
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(9) The second portion of the Christmas school vacation** 
as defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas 
day beginning at 1:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m., as long as the 
entire Christmas holiday is equally divided; 
C. Father's Day shall be spent with the father every year beginning 
at 9:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
D. Mother's Day shall be spent with the mother every year 
beginning at 9:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
E. Extended visitation with the father (Defendant) may be: 
(1) Up to four (4) weeks consecutive at the option of the 
father (Defendant); 
(2) Two (2) weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the 
noncustodial parent father (Defendant); and 
(3) The remaining two (2) weeks shall be subject to 
visitation for the custodial parent mother (Plaintiff) 
consistent with these guidelines; 
F. The mother (Plaintiff) shall have an identical two (2) week 
period of uninterrupted time during the child(ren)'s summer 
vacation from school for purposes of vacation; 
G. If the child(ren) is/are enrolled in year-round school, the father's 
(Defendant) extended visitation shall be one-half (14) of the 
vacation time for year-round school breaks, provided the mother 
(Plaintiff) has holiday and telephone visits; 
H. Notification of extended visitation or vacation weeks with the 
child(ren) shall be provided at least thirty (30) days in advance 
to the other parent; 
I. Holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation, and 
changes shall not be made to the regular rotation of the 
alternating weekend visitation schedule; 
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J. If a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school day, the father 
(Defendant) shall be responsible for the child(ren)'s attendance 
at school for that school day; 
K. If a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and 
the total holiday period extends beyond that time so that the 
child(ren) is/are free from school and the parent is free from 
work, the father (Defendant) shall be entitled to this lengthier 
holiday period; 
L. Telephone contact at reasonable hours; and 
M. Such other times as agreed between the parties. 
**"Christmas school vacation" means the time period beginning on the 
evening the child sets out of school for the Christmas school break until the 
evening before the child returns to school, except for Christmas Eve, 
Christmas Day, and New Year's Day. 
"Extended visitation" means a period of visitation other than a weekend, 
holiday as provided in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(f) and (2)(g), religious holidays 
as provided in Subsections 30-3-33(4) and (16), and ''Christmas school 
vacation. 
The parties shall further comply with the following: 
Keep each other advised of their current address and telephone number within 
twenty four (24) hours of any change; 
Special consideration shall be given by each parent to make the child(ren) 
available to attend family functions including funerals, weddings, family 
reunions, religious holidays, important ceremonies, and other significant 
events in the life of the child(ren) or in the life of either parent which may 
inadvertently conflict with the visitation schedule; 
The father (Defendant) shall pick up the child(ren) at the time specified and 
return the child(ren) at the time specified, and the child(ren)'s regular school 
hours shall not be interrupted; 
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The mother (Plaintiff) shall notify the father (Defendant) within twenty-four 
(24) hours of receiving notice of all significant school, social, sports, and 
community function in which the child(ren) is/are participating or being 
honored, and the father (Defendant) shall be entitled to attend and participate 
fully; 
The father (Defendant) shall have access directly to all school reports 
including preschool and day care reports and medical records and shall be 
notified immediately by the mother (Plaintiff) in the event of a medical 
emergency; 
Parental care shall be presumed to be better care for the child(ren) than 
surrogate care and the court shall encourage the parties to cooperate in 
allowing the father (Defendant), if willing and able, to provide child care; 
Each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of major religious holidays 
celebrated by the parents, and the parent who celebrates a religious holiday 
that the other parent does not celebrate shall have the right to be together with 
the child(ren) on the religious holiday. 
Refrain from making derogatory remarks about or to the other in the presence 
of the minor children. 
CHILD SUPPORT AND CHILD CARE 
5. For purposes of child support, the Court is going to use the maximum amount 
for two (2) children as stated on the current Uniform Child Support Guidelines. The Court 
finds that Defendant's income substantially exceeds the maximum on the schedule and that 
the needs of the children fall below the maximum of the schedule. The Court does not 
impute any income to Plaintiff for child support purposes. Therefore, for two (2) children, 
the child support shall be $1,400.00 per month as set forth in the Child Support Obligation 
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Worksheet (Sole Custody), which is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference, 
less a credit for one-half Q/2) of the insurance premium as provided in Paragraph 9. (The 
parties stipulated that the Court use a sole custody worksheet in determining child support.) 
6. Said child support payments shall be due one-half (14) on or before the fifth 
(5th) day and one-half QA) on or before the twentieth (20th) day of each month commencing 
May 1, 1996, and continuing every month thereafter until each child reaches the age of 
eighteen (18) or graduates from high school through normal matriculation, whichever is later. 
Upon Defendant's child support obligation for Krista being terminated, child support shall 
be automatically rescheduled using the maximum child support amount for one (1) child. 
7. Child support payments may be made directly to Plaintiff. If Defendant 
becomes delinquent in payment of support, said payments shall then be paid through 
automatic income withholding through the Utah State Department of Human Services. Office 
of Recovery Services by serving an Order to Withhold and Deliver. In accordance w;ith Utah 
Code Annotated § 62A-1 l-403(2)(b) and 78-45-7(4), the Defendant will then be assessed an 
additional check processing fee in the amount of $7.00, or such other amount as required by 
statute. This fee shall be included in the amount withheld and paid to the Office of Recovery 
Services. As an alternative to automatic income withholding, Defendant may pay support 
by wage assignment and/or direct deposit to Plaintiffs checking account. 
8. Child support shall be abated by one-half (I/2) during summer visitation as long 
as the children are with Defendant for at least twenty-five (25) of thirty (30) consecutive 
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days. 
HEALTH INSURANCE 
9. That Defendant should provide health insurance for said minor childrei(tf 
insurance is available at a reasonable cos^ \ Each party should pay one-half (!/2) of the 
uninsured medical and dental expenses for the children. Medical coverage should include 
all regular health and medical care, eye cam* psychological care, dental and orthodontic 
work. A party who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification of the cost 
and payment of medical expenses to the other party within thirty (30) days of payment. 
Reimbursement shall be made by the other party within thirty (30) days of receipt of such 
verification. 
IJFE INSURANCE 
10. Each party shall be awarded their present life insurance policies on themselves. 
The Court makes no order regarding maintaining insurance on behalf of the children. 
DIVISION OF PROPERTY 
11. The Plaintiff shall be awarded the parties' home and real property located at 
240 North 1480 East, Logan, Utah, valued at $520,000.00 with an equity of $245,506.00, 
free and clear of any interest of Defendant. Defendant shall immediately execute a Quit 
Claim Deed in favor of Plaintiff. Plaintiff shall be responsible for the mortgage, taxes, 
insurance and any other costs or assessments related to said property. 
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12. The Defendant is awarded the home and real property with improvements at 
745 East Foxridge, Providence, Utah, with an equity value of $105,600.00, free and clear of 
any interest of Plaintiff. Defendant shall be responsible for the mortgage, taxes, insurance 
and any other costs or assessment related to said property. 
13. Pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties, the Court finds that Plaintiff should 
return to Defendant his own personal genealogy and the figurines from his grandmother. The 
parties will also find a convenient time for Defendant to review family pictures and make 
copies of any family pictures requested by Defendant. Plaintiff shall make those pictures 
available for copying at Defendant's expense. Defendant will be responsible for returning 
all pictures to Plaintiff as quickly as possible. 
14. Plaintiff is awarded the furniture and furnishings in her possession at a value 
of$50,000.00. 
15. Defendant is awarded the furniture and furnishings in his possession, including 
the stereo, books, office and computer, valued at $16,000.00. 
16. Defendant is awarded the four-wheeler with blade, valued at $3,000.00. 
17. Plaintiff is awarded the Suburban valued at $28,500.00 as appraised by 
Thomas Axtell. 
18. Defendant is awarded the Blazer valued at $24,000.00 as appraised by Thomas 
Axtell. 
10 
19. Plaintiff is awarded the Central Life and two (2) Jackson National Policies 
identified hereinafter. 
20. Defendant is awarded the five (5) Jackson National Policies, Central Life 
Policy, Lord Abbot IRA, IDEX 401(K), Oppenheimer and ATEL Account as stated 
hereinafter. 
21. The Court does not establish the value on the VEBA and awards one-half (!4) 
of the VEBA to each party to be distributed pursuant to a qualified domestic relations order. 
However, based on the testimony of the value of the VEBA, the Court will allow Defendant, 
at his sole discretion, to otherwise liquidate the VEBA, providing notice to Plaintiff of any 
such liquidation. Defendant shall immediately pay one-half (!4) of any net proceeds realized 
from the VEBA to Plaintiff, if it is liquidated. 
22. The Court further awards one-half (14) of the RANCON Investment to each of 
the parties. The Genesis Family Limited Partnership should be awarded as follows: Fifty 
percent (50%) each party. However, the Court creates a voting right and awardsithatright 
te-©efendantso that he has voting rights of all four shares. Plaintiff has an economic one-
half interest, but Defendant has the right to control the partnership. 
23. The Court, therefore, awards the property and values as follows: 
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To Plaintiff: 
ASSET 
Logan home 
Furnishings in Logan home 
Central Life 
Jackson National 
Jackson National 
Suburban (Trade/Pontiac) 
One-half (!/2)VEBA 
One-half (!/2)RANCON 
One-half (!/2) General Partnership, Genesis 
TOTAL: 
VALUES 
$ 245,506.00 
50,000.00 
1,593.00 
324.00 
292.00 
28,500.00 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
S 326,215.00 
To Defendant: 
ASSET VALUES 
Providence home 
Furnishings in Providence home 
Four-wheeler with blade 
Blazer 
Jackson National 
Jackson National 
Jackson National 
Jackson National 
Jackson National 
Central Life 
Lord Abbot 
IDEX 
Oppenheimer 
ATEL 
One-half (!/2)VEB A 
One-half (!£) RANCON 
$ 105,600.00 
16,000.00 
3,000.00 
24,000.00 
2,340.00 
6,213.00 
2,009.00 
1,991.00 
2,575.00 
18,481.00 
6,590.00 
8,061.00 
2,229.00 
22,380.00 
N/A 
N/A 
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One-half (14) General Partnership, Genesis N/A 
TOTAL $ 221,469.00 
DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS 
24. Each party shall assume and pay the mortgage associated with the property 
awarded to each party, holding the other harmless therefrom. 
25. Defendant should pay and be liable for the MBNA Master Card Charge in the 
amount of $11,161.00. The Court finds that even though the MBNA Master Card debt has 
been paid partially by Plaintiff, the Court has considered that fact and confirms that 
Defendant should pay the balance of the MBNA Master Card. 
26. Each party should be responsible for all individual and personal debts and 
obligations incurred since the parties' separation on or about February 1, 1995, holding the 
other party harmless therefrom. 
EQUALIZATION OF MARITAL ESTATE 
27. The Court finds the difference between the property awarded to Plaintiff and 
the property and debt awarded to Defendant to be $115,907.00. To equalize the division of 
property between the parties, the Court finds that it is necessary for Plaintiff to pay to 
Defendant $57,953.50. 
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28. In order to satisfy the amount awarded to Defendant to equalize the property 
distribution, the Court will deduct therefrom the difference of the alimony and child support 
awarded by the Court as provided in Paragraphs 38 and 39 from the alimony and child 
support actually paid to Plaintiff. As of June 1, 1997, the balance of the amount due on the 
property division, or $7,058.50, as provided in Paragraph 39, shall be paid by allowing 
Defendant to deduct up to $1,000.00 per month until that amount is paid and satisfied. The 
deduction of $3,915.00 per month which have accumulated for thirteen (13) months (May 
1996 through May. 1997), as well as the ongoing deduction of $1,000.00 per month until the 
balance of the property division is satisfied are clarified to be alimony to be treated as such 
by the parties for tax purposes. 
ALIMONY 
29. The Court finds that Defendant's average income for the past four (4) years 
(i.e., 1992 through 1995), is $512,114.00 after deducting reasonable and necessary business 
expenses. The Court did not add back the VEBA or other amounts. 
30. The Court did not include in the four (4) year average the income for the first 
four (4) months of January through April, 1996. The Court finds that a four (4) month 
duration is too short a time to determine any reliability, that it is not reflective of Defendant's 
actual income, and that a four (4) year average is more appropriate to determine current 
income. 
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31. The Court finds that the Plaintiffs current ability to earn an income is 
approximately $1,000.00 per month. The Court finds that there was testimony that Plaintiff 
could obtain a teaching certificate in four (4) quarters, or approximately one (1) year, but the 
Court believes realistically it would take approximately two (2) years for Plaintiff to obtain 
a teaching certificate. The Court further finds that Plaintiff is capable and will qualify as a 
teacher and that there was testimony that the average salary for teachers in Cache County is 
approximately $29,000.00 a year. 
32. The Court finds that it is likely Defendant's income will be lower in 1996 and 
thereafter than the four (4) year average determined by the Court. The Court finds that ten 
percent (10%) is an appropriate amount to reduce the average income, which is 
approximately $51,211.00. The Court, therefore, finds that Defendant's current income is 
$460,903.00 per year or $38,408.00 per month. 
33. To determine alimony, the Court finds that Defendant will pay approximately 
forty-eight and twenty-five one hundredths percent (48.25%) of his income in federal and 
state income taxes, or $18,531.00 per month. The Court will deduct that amount from 
Defendant's monthly income to derive a net monthly income, after taxes, of $19,876.00. 
34. If the Court were to deduct child support of $1,400.00 and Plaintiffs income 
of $1,000.00 in order to determine a difference in incomes and then equalize that income, 
the difference between the parties' incomes would be $17,478.00 and the equalized income 
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would be $8,738.00. 
35. However, upon considering the tax consequences as argued by the parties, the 
Court finds that the actual cost of alimony paid by Defendant is sixty percent (60%) of the 
projected amount of $8,738.00, realizing a tax savings to Defendant of $3,496.00. Adding 
the tax savings back in to the projected alimony would equal $12,734.00 [sic] (November 
15, 1996 Hearing, p. 34 1.20). 
36. The Court further finds that Plaintiffs projected tax consequences are 
approximately seventeen percent (17%) of her income. The amount of taxes Plaintiff would 
pay on the projected alimony of $8,738.00 would be $1,485.00, reducing the net projected 
alimony to $7,253.00. Adding Plaintiffs imputed income of $1,000.00 would realize net 
income to Plaintiff of $8,253.00. Including the child support award of $1,400.00 would 
increase the net income to Plaintiff to $9,653.00. 
37. If the Court were to then equalize the net incomes, the Court would order 
Defendant to pay an additional $2,240.00, for a total of $10,978.00. [sic] (November 15, 
1996 Hearing, p. 35, 1.10-12). The Court, therefore, establishes and reaffirms alimony to 
Plaintiff at $10,515.00 per month as stated in the Court's ruling on May 7, 1996. (November 
15, 1996 Hearing, p. 36, 1.8-10). 
38. Although the Court initially determined that alimony should be paid retroactive 
to April 1, 1995, upon further consideration and argument from the parties, the Court finds 
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that the permanent award of alimony should commence as of the date of trial, or May 3, 
1996. However, since Defendant has been allowed to continue paying alimony at the 
temporary level of $6,600.00 per month, the difference, or $3,915.00 per month shall be 
credited toward the $57,553.50 owed to Defendant to equalize the division of the marital 
estate as determined by the Court. 
39. Alimony shall commence at the permanent level of $10,515.00 on June 1, 
1997. Therefore, thirteen (13) months at $3,915.00 per month, or $50,895.00, shall be 
subtracted from the amount owed to Defendant of $57,953.50, leaving a total net amount 
owing to Defendant as of June 1, 1997, of $7,058.50. That amount can be paid to Plaintiff 
by Defendant deducting $1,000.00 per month from ongoing alimony payments, commencing 
June 1, 1997, until satisfied. 
40. The Court finds that Plaintiffs monthly expenses as provided in Plaintiffs 
Exhibit No. 5, not including savings, retirement or tithing; equal approximately $10,462.00 
and that Defendant's monthly expenses as provided in Defendant's Exhibit No. 16, not 
including expenses for Tim or tithing, equal approximately $4,340.00. However, the Court 
finds that there is substantial income in excess of the needs of the parties contrary to most, 
divorce actions, and not only bases the alimony award on the stated needs, but in adjusting 
the available income between the parties. 
41. Based on the Court's finding that Plaintiff should be able to earn an income 
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of approximately $2,500.00 per month commencing approximately May 1, 1998, the Court 
finds that alimony should be reduced by $1,500.00 per month effective May 1, 1998. 
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS 
42. The Court finds that Plaintiffs attorney's fees are reasonable and necessarily 
incurred in this matter. However, based on the alimony award, the Court finds that each 
party has the ability to pay his or her own attorney's fees and does not award attorney's fees. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law previously entered by the Court 
on or about June 12, 1996 are hereby reaffirmed. 
2. Each party should be awarded the property and debts as indicated in the 
Findings of Fact. 
3. That Defendant should be ordered to pay alimony and child support in the 
amount as stated in the Findings of Fact and for the reasons stated therein. 
4. That the parties are entitled to a Decree entered in accordance with all of the 
Findings of Fact as stated hereinabove. 
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DATED this day of , 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
Clint S. Judkins 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the <Q3*A day of May, 1997,1 mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, to the 
following person(s), postage pre-paid thereon, by depositing in the U.S. Mail. 
Kenneth A. Okazaki 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Sharon McCormick 
~—yvvrL.~ . Xr . 
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NOTICE 
You will please take notice that the above entitled document will be presented by the 
clerk to the assigned commissioner and/or judge for his signature upon the expiration of five 
(5) days from the date of this Notice, plus three (3) days for mailing, unless written objection 
is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration. 
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IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KIM LARSON, 
vs. 
BRAD LARSON, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET 
(SOLE CUSTODY AND PATERNITY) 
Civil No. 954-081 
1. Enter the # of Natural and Adopted Children of this Mother 
and Father for Whom Support Is to Be Awarded. 
2a. Enter the father's and mother's gross monthly income. 
Refer to Instructions for definition of income. 
2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is actually paid. (Do 
not enter alimony ordered for this case). 
2c. Enter previously ordered child support. (Do not enter 
obligations ordered for the children in Line 1). 
2d. OPTIONAL: Enter the amount from Line 12 of the 
Children in Present Home Worksheet for either parent 
3. Subtract Lines 2b, 2c, and 2d from 2a. This is the Adjusted 
Gross Income fro child support purposes. 
4. Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the number of 
children in Line 1 to the Support Table. Find the Base 
Combined Support Obligation. Enter it here. 
5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line 3 by 
the COMBINED adjusted monthly gross in Line 3. 
6. Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain each 
parent's share of the Base Support Obligation. 
MOTHER 
III III IIII III 
II III IIIIIIII 
$ -0-
-
-
-
$ -0-
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / 
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / 
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / 
-0- % 
$ 1 
FATHER 
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / 
III ii mum 
$ 38,408.00 
-
-
-
$ 38,408.00 
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / 
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / 
miiiiiiini j 
100 % 
$ 1,400.00 1 
COMBINED 
1 2 1 
1 I I I I I I U I 
[ l l l l l l l l l l 
II nun II 
ini min 
1 m mm/ 
iiiimm 
iiiii/mi 
iiiiiiini J 
$ 38,408.00 
$ 1,400.00 
llllllllll 
l l l l l l l l l l J 
l l l l l l l l l l 
l l l l l l l l l l j 
7. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD: Bring down the amount in Line 6 
for the Obligor Parent or enter the amount from the Low Income Table. 
$ 1,400.00 
10. 
Which parent is the obligor? ( ) Mother ( X ) Father 
Is the support award the same as the guideline amount in Line 7? ( X ) Yes ( ) No 
If NO, enter the amount ordered: $ , and answer number 10. 
What were the reasons stated by the Court for the deviation? 
( ) property settlement 
( ) excessive debts of the marriage 
( ) absence of need of the custodial parent 
( ) Other: ; 
Attorney Bar No. 3814 ( ) Electronic filing (X ) Manual Filing 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and 
to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public 
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands 
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural 
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer, 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of 
the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony, 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, 
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
for a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs chal-
lenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases 
involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, 
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and 
health care of parties and children — Division of 
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — 
Custody and visitation — Determination of ali-
mony — Nonmeritorious petition for modifica-
tion. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it 
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and 
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order 
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, 
and dental care insurance for the dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5; 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of 
joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or 
incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or 
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabili-
ties and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, 
Chapter 11, Recovery Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances'are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide 
child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, 
health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for 
debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best 
interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer 
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a visitation 
schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to 
enforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under this chapter. 
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a 
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the 
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if 
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or 
defended against in good faith. 
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order by 
a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursuant to 
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted by the 
court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual 
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the 
other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation. 
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining 
alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage, 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining 
alimony. 
78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed in-
come. 
(1) As used in the guidelines, agross income" includes: 
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources, 
except under Subsection (3); and 
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, 
gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, 
trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, 
social security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment 
compensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments from 
"nonmeans-tested" government programs. 
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one 
full-time 40-hour job. However, if and only if during the time prior to the 
original support order, the parent normally and consistently worked more than 
40 hours at his job, the court may consider this extra time as a pattern in 
calculating the parent's ability to provide child support. 
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are: 
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC); 
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training 
Partnership Act, S.S.I., Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assistance; 
and 
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent. 
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall 
be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employ-
ment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses 
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to 
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to 
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the 
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross 
receipts. 
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the 
amount of business income determined for tax purposes. 
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual 
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly 
income. 
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each 
parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements and 
complete copies of tax returns from at least the most recent year unless the 
court finds the verification is not reasonably available. Verification of 
income from records maintained by the Office of Employment Security 
may be substituted for pay stubs, employer statements, and income tax 
returns. 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether 
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists. 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection 
(7). 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates 
to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the 
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon 
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, 
occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar 
backgrounds in the community. 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at 
least at the federal TniTiinniTn wage for a 40-hour work week, lb impute a 
greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer 
in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to 
the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children 
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can 
earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he 
cannot earn minimum wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to 
establish basic job skills; or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the 
